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IN

TH~~

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

A.C.KARTCHNER~diREXE

B. KARTCHXER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
LYMAN :MERRILL HORNE,
FREDERICK C. SORENSEN,
and CLICQUOT CLUB BOTTLING C01IPANY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, a corporation,

Case No.

7911

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action against the receiver of Clicquot
Club Bottling Company, Lyman Merrill Horne and
Frederick C. Sorensen to rescind a transaction whereby
1
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the personal defendants, as officers of this corporation,
issued stock of the corporation to plaintiffs.
The defendant corporation was formed in 1947 for
the purpose of bottling and merchandising soft drinks.
When the corporation was formed, 200,000 shares of
common stock were authorized, issued and paid for by
the stockholder8. Ownership of this stock was as follows:
Frederick Sorensen -------------------------------------Winders ---------------------------------------------------------Hornes -----------------------------------------------------------Stanis ----------------------------------------------·--------··-------

101,000
48,000
41,000
10,000

TOTAL________________________ 200,000
All the stockholders, except Stanis, were members
of Dr. Horne's family.
The business progressed in a profitable manner,
more or less, until the latter part of 1948 and fore part
of 1949. In the summer of 1949, Dr. and Mrs. Horne
had advanced $19,000.00 to the company and advised
their son-in-law, Frederick Sorensen, who was managing the enterprise, that they were not in a position to
advance any further sums. Sorensen was told by them
to obtain someone else to contribute capital and they
would forgive their debt against the corporation and
turn their stock in.
Thereafter, Sorensen undertook to find someone to
come into the business with him and after negotiations
over two or three months, plaintiffs agreed to purchase
100,000 shares of this corporate stock from the corporation for the sum of $12,000.00 and two trucks valued at
2
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$6,000.000, or a total purchase price of $18,000.00. This
arrangement was concluded in 'Septeinber, 1949, when
the first payment was n1ade to the corporation. Plaintiff
A. C. Kartchner was to become actively engaged in tlw
business on November 1st. Payn1ents by plaintiffs for
the stock continued, in irregular amounts from September 23, 1949 to :llarch 6, 1950. Pa-yments were made over
this period from a joint checking account of both plaintiffs.
On October 31st, Dr. Horne was advised by Sorensen
that he had concluded a deal whereupon Dr. Horne endorsed his stock, wrote a letter resigning as an officer
and put his stock together with Sorensen's stock, which
he had been holding, in an envelope addressed to the
bottling company and mailed the same. These certificates
representing 142,000 shares were at the Clicquot Club
Bottling Company on November 1, 1949, (R. 218, 219,
182, 183). These certificates of stock remained as part
of the books and records of the Clicquot Club Bottling
Company thereafter. Sorensen's stock bears his endorsement.
Sometime during the day on November 1, 1949, a
certificate No. 15, for 100,000 shares, was issued to plaintiffs. This certificate bears the signature of Dr. Horne
and Mr. Sorensen. There is positive testimony that these
certificates were in the office of the corporation on November 1st (R. 218). Mr. Sorensen was unable to say
whether the certificates mailed by Dr. Horne arrived at
the office before or after plaintiffs' certificate was delivered to plaintiffs (R. 228, 229).
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Upon the issuance of this certificate to plaintiffs,
oaths of office were executed by Mr. Sorensen and both
plaintiffs, and the affairs of the corporation were thereafter conducted by Sorensen and A. C. Kartchner. Plaintiff A. C. Kartchner became Secretary and Treasurer
and the custodian of the books and records of this corporation on such date. Mrs. Kartchner became a director.
Mr. Kartchner was advised of the stockholdings
prior to November 1st, and fully informed (R. 224, 215,
216, 217). Originally it was expected that all the other
stock would be returned and that Kartchners and Sorensen would each have 100,000 shares, but it was understood between Kartchner and Sorensen that Sorensen
would take a reduction from that number of shares in
the amount of the stock then outstanding that was not
returned. This arrangement was known and confirmed
prior to November 1, 1949 and later in a meeting these
two men had with Homer "\Vinder in the middle o~
December, 1949.
In the fore part of June, 1950, the company was
again in financial difficulties and Mary Winder, one of
the stockholders, was endeavoring to purchase the half
interest of plaintiffs' in the company. For this purpose
she sought the advice of her brother-in-law, Judge
Joseph G. Jeppson, and a meeting was held where the
stockhoidings were discussed and where plaintiff A. C.
Kartchner admitted that he was aware of the fact that
'Sorensen's interest was reduced to 42,000 shares, which
had not 'been issued to him by the corporation (R. 245,
4
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247). This certificate due Sorensen was not issued
because he hoped to have other stock surrendered thereby increasing the amount due him. At the time of this
meeting, Sorensen had withdrawn from the corporation
and was employed in Idaho.
Later in July, the company was put into receivership
and this is the first notice anyone had that l\Ir. l{artchner
claimed his stock was void, whereupon this action was
commenced.
The trial Court found that full disclosures were
made throughout of the facts surrounding the initial
agreement between Kartchner and Sorensen and the
record shows that these were amply supported.
This action was commenced by a complaint (R. 1)
which alleged that defendants Horne and Sorensen issued
100,000 shares of common stock of the Clicquot Bottling
Works to plaintiffs, as the officers of this corporation.
This complaint alleges that their action in so doing was
a deliberate fraud inasmuch as they knew such stock
certificate represented an over-issue. This pleading
sought recovery of $18,272.44, which represented cash,
as alleged, paid for this stock.
Later this complaint was amended (R. 11) to allege
that $12,272.44 was paid in cash and $6,000.00 was repre- ·
sented by two (2) trucks. To this complaint, defendants.
Horne and Sorensen filed a motion for summary judgment (R. 13), supported by affidavits and the deposition
of plaintiff. These supporting documents present the
same evidence as was presented at the trial. .
Later, a second amended complaint (R. 50) was filed,·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which, in addition to the matter of over-issue, injected
a theory of fraud based on the fact that the accounts
payable were misrepresented and that the transaction
was rendered voidable because of such misrepresentations by defendant Sorensen. On the trial of the matter
considerable of the evidence was addressed to this new
question raised by the second complaint, which involved
the amount of debts owed by the corporation.
At the time of trial another amendment (R. 100)
was made where the amount of recovery asked was
reduced to $18,046.53. After the trial another amended
complaint (R. 72) was filed, in which fraud of any kind
was eliminated. This amendment was ostensibly and
expressly made to conform to the evidence and this
amendment alleges that the mere fact of the issue of
stock being made is sufficient without the other elements
of fraud.
The Court found that the defendants were in exercise of good faith throughout the whole transaction,
which is amply supported by the record.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence in this
case supports the proposition that the certificate of stock
of Fred Sorensen was surrendered on November 1st
when the certificate of stock for 100,000 shares was issued
to plaintiffs. This is conclusively demonstrated by this
fact alone: It was admitted on all sides that there were
200,000 shares, only, authorized. This, of necessity, required the cancellation of Sorensen's 101,000, irrespective
of the other holdings and the disposition of such other
holdings, and plaintiff Kartchner knew this long before
6
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November 1st when his stock was issued (R. 215, 216,
217). In other words, if the Stanis, Winder and IIorne
stock had been surrendered as originally contemplated
it 1ca.s still n.ecessary that Sorensen's certificate be cancelled. Plaintiff Kartchner would have to know this even
under his version of the story, which was given no
credence, and properly so, by the trial Court.
Appellants, throughout their brief, assttme that the
Sorensen certificate was not endorsed on N oven1ber 1,
1949. The fact is undisputed that Sorensen's stock
endorsed was a part of the books and records of this
corporation on November 1st. The record is quoted front
Page 180 to support the proposition that the stock was
not endorsed on November 1st. The only date mentioned
in the record, Page 180, is the date of October 31st, at
which time it was admittedly not endorsed. Mr. Sorensen
(R. 182), in referring to that part of his deposition referred to in the record at page 180, explicitly testifies
to the fact that the date referred to in the record at 180,
and as quoted on Page 18 and 19 of appellants' brief, referred to October 31st and not November 1st.
There is no positive evidence in this record when
Sorensen's endorsement was attached. The logical assumption is that it was signed on. November 1st in view
of the avowed intention of everyone connected with this
case, including plaintiffs.
Dr. Horne says he mailed the Sorensen certificate on.
October 31st, and Sorensen says the certificate was in
the office of the bottling company on November 1st.
Sorensen's testimony (R. 218) :
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"Q. Were Dr. Horne's shares of stock and your
shares of stock in the office of the company
that day (Nov. 1) ~
''A.

rl,hey came-they were there that day, yes.

"Q.

State whether or not on the 1st of November
you considered your stock was surrendered
to the company.

~\t that tin1e my stock was. I considered
myself as owning the minority."
R. 219, questioned by Mr. Mulliner.

''A.

"Q.

State whether or not you considered you had
the right to withdraw that certificate at any
time after that.

"A.

No, I didn't have."

Mr. Sorensen testified (R. 229, 230) that he couldn't
remember and couldn't say whether Horne's and Sorensen's certificates were at the company prior to when
Dr. Horne signed the Kartchner certificates or not, but
that he was positive both the Horne and Sorensen certificates were in the office on November 1st, the date when
plaintiffs' certificate was issued, and remained there continually thereafter.
Appellants, in their statement of facts, assume and
state as facts things that are absolutely not supported
by this record. The most serious of these statements appears the first time at Page 4, where they state the fact
to be:
"Neither the letters nor the enclosed certificates had been received at the corporation offices
at the time the Kartchner certificate was signed
on November 1, 1949."

8
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And again at Page 5:
.. It had not been received bv Sorensen or tlw
corporation at the tin1e the Ka.~·tchner certificate
was issued."
The record, at Page 196, is quoted in support of this
statement. This statement is merely a statement of Dr.
Horne's wherein Sorensen told him at the tin1e of the
signing of appellants' certificate that he had not received
his resignation. On this same page of the record, Dr.
Home testifies unequivocally that. the Horne stock and
Sorensen stock were surrendered. The positive testimony of Sorensen himself here again is that his stock,
as well as Dr. Horne's stock, was a part of the books and
records of this corporation on November 1st, and were
available for inspection by Mr. Kartchner, who then
became Secretary of the corporation and the official
custodian of its books and records (R. 218, 219).
Another flagrant example of this practice is contained· on Page 6 of their brief where this argument is
made:
"He (Sorensen) had made no transfer of his
own stock but contemplated doing so in the future (197). Up until the meeting was held with
Homer Winder on or after November 17, 1949,
Sorensen didn't know how much of his stock he
might be required to surrender to effectuate his
plans (208, 209, 220)."
In support of this statement, Appellants quote from
Dr. Horne's deposition:
"A.

200,000 in the company, and I had turned
mine in, Myrtle had turned her's in, and the
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only one I knew about was the certificate I
signed, 100,000, and Frederick owned 101,000.
It was up to Mr. Kartchner after that, wasn't

itY
"Q. Did you check prior to the time you issued
this certificate, to see if any other stock than
your stock and :Mrs. Horne's stock had actually been surrendered to the company~
"A.

I asked Frederick if he was going to transfer
his stock to Mr. Kartchner, and he said that
was the arrangement."

This quotation is only to the effect, as consistently
maintained throughout this case, that Sorensen had and
did surrender his stock. The latter sentence of the above
argument is absolutely contrary to the testimony in the
record. The fact, in this connection, was that Sorensen
surrendered all his stock on November 1st, which was
absolutely necessary, in any event, and the matter of how
much he was to receive back from the corporation depended on whatever other stock was surrendered. This
is conclusively shown by plaintiffs' expressed understanding in the meeting of June 6th with Judge Jeppson.
The gentlemen involved in this transaction were not
technicians in the handling of corporate affairs and they
intended obviously that the stock surrenders and transfers should be more or less simultaneous. The fact remains and is conceded by all that Kartchner received
one-half the stock of this corporation and nobody has
ever denied or impeached his right to the same, and if
any irregularities existed in the matter of the books of
the company it was Mr. Kartchner's responsibility, as
10
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the secretary of the emnpauy, to see that such irregularities were rectified.
The facts of this case show a clear and compl~tP
estoppel on the part of each party to upset this trant-'action. This is readily apparent if, instead of the corporation failing, it had prospered and the action was
brought by Sorensen and Horne to declare ICartchners'
stock void. In such a state of circu1nstances there can
be little doubt but what they would be estopped to assert
such a thing and it is equally apparent that ICartchners
should now be placed in the same position. It is submitted that a finding of fact or rule of law should be applied which works both ways in case the shoe was on the
other foot, as illustrated above.
Only $1,750.00 of the purchase price for plaintiffs'
stock has been paid up to November 1st. It is impossible
to believe, and the trial Court did not believe, that a
businessman of ~Ir. Kartchner's talents would pay the
balance of $11,296.53 without having assured himself
that Sorensen's certificate for 101,000 shares was surrendered to the corporation, especially when he was fully
aware of the situation (R. 215,216, 217).

POINT I
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
FINDINGS OBJECTED TO BY APPELLANTS.

In this division of appellants' brief they take objection to the trial Court's findings, Nos. 12, 13, 15' 16,
17, 19 and 20, on the ground that there is not evidence
to support them. The argument will be taken up as
11
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to each of these findings in that order.
Findings Nos. 12 a.nd 13
This finding is supported squarely by the record
at Page 219, where Sorensen testified as follows:

"Q. During these negotiations, during the summer, was Dr. Horne involved in any manned
"A. No.
"Q. Were the dealings exclusively between you
and Kartchner¥
"A. Yes, we were the only ones that ever discussed the matter I know of."
This state of affairs is conclusively affirmed by the
fact that Dr. Horne did not know with whom Sorensen
was dealing until November 1st, when his name was first
mentioned. Dr. Horne testified (R.190):
"Q. Did you ever talk with Mr. Kartchner in your
life about this deal prior to November 1st?
"A.

No sir.

"Q. After November 1st did you have anyth.i.n.g
to do with this company whatsoever Y
"A. Well, I sent my wife down one time to ask
them to pay the rent.
"Q.

Other than being their landlord, I mean in
the internal affairs of the corporation, did
you take any part?

"A.

No sir."

Appellants then in their brief re-argue the same
proposition of fact that they make in their findings of
fact, which is, that Sorensen's stock was not delivered to
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the corporation or endorsed prior to the issuance to
Kartchners of their certificate, and practically the whole
testimony is repeated again. Assun1ing that the argument presented by appellants has any merit, they have
the burden of proving that I~artchners' certificate wa~
issued prior to the surrender of Sorensen's certificate.
There is not one u·ord of e~·idence in this record which
supports th.is.
In speaking of any representation, the evidence of
Dr. Horne is (R. 114) :
"Q. When you signed that certificate you illtended the Kartchners to rely on its validity and genuineness, did you not Dr. Horne"{

''A. When I sign an instrument yes, it is supposed
to be genuine and it was genuine."
The argument commencing at Page 15 of appellants'
brief is to the effect that the signature of Dr. Horne on
the stock certificate amounts to a false representation.
Dr. Horne, as above indicated, testifies squarely that
appellants' stock certificate was genuine.
Sorensen testifies time and again that Kartchner's
certificate was genuine. Add to this the fact that both
appellants and Sorensen, immediately upon the issuance
of their certificate, sat down and held a stockholders'
meeting and that Mr. Kartchner was elected Secretary
and thereby became the custodian and in possession .of
the stock books and records, and thereafter continued to
pay substantially all the purchase price for this stock.
Mr. Sorensen, at the time of this Ineeting, testified that
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Dr. Horne was no longer a stockholder (R. 232) and that
Sorensen's stock was surrendered in the same manner.
Again at Page 18 of appellants' brief the same testirnony is set out as is set out in the statement of Fact and
appellants continue to urge that the dialogue there refers
to November 1st, when, as has been previously indicated,
Sorensen, on being asked, testified that that part of the
deposition, so far as dates were concerned, referred to
October 31st and not November 1st.
"Q. I show you your deposition and I'll ask you
to read the same places where you went, and
asking if when you answered that it hadn't
been turned back to which date you refer?
"A.

I don't understand your question, Dick.

"Q. Now on this down here where you read,
what date are you referring to1
"A.

To October 31st.

"Q. And it was returned November 1sU

"A. Yes.

..

'"'"

Questioned by Mr. Mulliner:
"Q.

It was returned November 1st~

"A.

It was returned November 1st."

At the top of Page 20 of appellants' brief, this
answer of Dr. Horne's was given:
"A.

While he still owned it, and after we had
given ours to him, I think they were lying
in the drawer together, but he hadn't signed
his at tha.t time because he didn't know who
wa-s gotng to get it." (Italics ~ appellants.)
14
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Appellants insist that this testimony shows that
Sorensen's certificate was not endorsed. This specific
answer was asked Dr. Horne and he said the drawer he
referred to was in his office not the corporations, and the
date must, therefore, be October 31st. (See Record 204) :
".\.

That is where the phrase referring to those
that were lying in the dnrwer together before
I mailed then1.

''Q.

That is what you meant by that, is that
correct'?

''A.

That is right.''

. At Page 20, appellants again assume that the Horne
and Sorensen stock was not received until after Kartchners' certificate was issued and assmne further that on
N" ovember 1st, Sorensen's certificate was not endorsed.
The only testimony given on this subject was by S-orensen and this testimony is as follows (R. 229):

"Q. Mr. Sorensen, in answer to ~:ir. Mulliner's
question whether Dr. Horne's stock and yours
was in the office on the day the stock certificate was issued * * * I believe you said they
were.
"A. Yes.

"Q. They were in the office prior to the time you
issued that certificate, were they~
"A.

That I can't say definitely, Mr. Tanner, because I don't know. The doctor mailed those
certificates- what time of day the Kartchners were there I can't remember. I gave no
thought to the matter_ at that time.

15
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"Q.

You gave no thought whether the other certificates were in at that time~

"A.

No, I knew they would be there ; I knew those
certificates were forthcoming, let's put it that
way.
'"'

"Q.

..

'rhen when you prepared the 100,000 share
certificate, did you or didn't you know that
the other certificates were there or on the
way to you?

I didn't know at that particular time whether
they were on their way at that time or there,
I don't know the precise time or anything."
It is submitted that this type of testimony absolutely refutes the position taken by appellants and can
in no way be considered as testimony that will support
the burden of proof placed upon appellants.
The fact still remains that Sorensen's certificate for
101,000 shares was a part of the books and records of this
corporation on November 1st, and there it remained till
June of 1950, and when removed it bore the endorsement
of Sorensen (See R. 226) :
"A.

Questioned by ~fr. l\tlulliner:
"Q. Where were these stock books and records
kept, if you lmow l
"A.

'fhey were kept in the company.

"Q.

vVhat do you mean, in the company1

"A.

In the desk in the office of the Clicquot Club
Bottling Company.

"Q.

Do you know of your own knowledge they
were there all the time f
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"A. All the thne until I believe June of 1950."
On cross examination, ~Ir. Sorensen testified further
(R. 182):
"Q. :Mr. Sorensen, do you know where your stock

certificate was .X oveinber 1st •?
··A.

November 1st, at the plant,

"Q. \Vhat do you mean by the plant1
.. A.

You 1nean- in the- pardon me - Clicquot
Club Bottling Cmnpany, in the office in
the drawer where we kept all the stock.

"Q. Was it there November 1st 1
•'A.

Yes, I think it was.

"Q.

How long was it there, do you know1

"A. It was there until June, 1950.
"Q.

And were all the stock records kept in the
Clicquot Club office in the drawer there 1

"A. Yes."
There is no evidence of when the endorsement of
Sorensen was made on his certificate for 101,000 shares.
The above evidence shows that the certificate was placed
with the other cancelled stock certificates of the bottling
company and remained there continuously until June of
1950, at which time and upon its removal it bore this
endorsement. There is positive testimony, as indicated
above, that the stock was surrendered which connotes
and indicates beyond question that it was endorsed. The
testimony of Sorensen, as a whole, shows that he was
sufficiently familiar with corporate practice to understand this.
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Appellants point to an instance in Dr. Horne's testimony and an instance in Sorensen's testimony from which
they infer that it was not endorsed on November 1st.
However, in each of those instances the witness involved
testified positively, as indicated above, that they were
not referring to November 1st but to October 31st, when
they testified the stock was not endorsed.
The whole argument and brief of appellants is
predicated, therefore, on a fact that does not exist and
the finding of the trial Court that there was stock for reissue on November 1st is arnply supported and is decisive
of this law suit.
Finding No. 15
The objection to this finding seems to be nothing
short of frivolous. (See R. 223) :
"Q. Who handled those books~
"A.

lvir. Kartchner did.

"Q. "\Vho had custody of
"A.

Mr. Kartchner kept them.

"Q. Where were they
"A.

them~

kept~

In the office of the company."

(R. 183):
"Q. It was returned November 1stf
"A.

It was returned November 1st.

"Q. But the stock books and the stock was there
all the time~
"A. They were there all the time.
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"Q. Did Mr. Kartchner have access to this
drawer!

"A. Yes.
"Q. Did this drawer contain other records of the
company!

'"A. Yes, it held all the books of the company,
what books there might be."
Finding No. 16

At the risk of see1ning repetitious, to answer the
objections to this finding it must be repeated that both
the Kartchners knew that Sorensen. had 101,000 shares
of stock so that in all events that certificate must be
surrendered -if Kartchners were to get 100,000 shares.
The· support for Finding No. 16 is found at Page 217
of this record. Sorensen's testimony:

"A. Before November 1st I had agreed if anything happened where I couldn't own half
of the stock myself I would take a lower
issue."
Question (by Mr. Mulliner):
"Q. Did you tell Kartchner that¥

"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you tell him that on more than one occasion! ·

"A. Specifically I can't say how many times. We
talked the same thing over so many times
it was repetitious.
"Q.

This subject and this arrangement was discussed more than once, is that the testimony?

"A.

Yes."
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The question of Mrs. Kartchner's status in this lawsuit may just as well be disposed of here. She became
an officer of the corporation on November 1st and substantially all the purchase price for this stock was paid
from joint funds, of which she must have had knowledge
subsequent to this date.
She was called as a witness and did not deny that
Mr. Kartchner was acting in her behalf in any particular.
In view of this fact, how can appellant by assumption and
innuendo ask the trial Court or this Court to grant her
more relief than Mr. Kartchner, or place her in a better
position in any respect than ~Ir. Kartchner1
'Vhile a witness, if such was the fact, she was in a
position to repudiate any or all things that her husband
did, but she did not make this choice and, therefore, both
Mr. and Mrs. Kartchner should be treated exactly alike.
This action of Mrs. Kartchner, as a witness, conclusively shows and establishes an appointment of Mr.
Kartchner as her agent, which has never been repudiated
or questioned.
Finding No. 17
Reading of this record will show beyond any question that Finding No. 17 is supported and that there was
stock in the treasury of the company on November 1st
available for re-issue on that day.
Appellants, for the third time, recite the same evidence and make the same contentions as they did in the
Statement of Facts and their arguments attacking Findings No. 12 and 13. They argue at Pages 22 and 23 again
that the Sorensen stock was not returned on November
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1st. The only evidence on this subject is given by Sorensen who states positively it was (R. 229). Sorensen in his
testimony couldn't say definitely whether the shares were
there at the ti1ue the certificates were signed by Dr.
Horne or whether they weren't (R. p. 230).
Appellants have the burden of proof on this issue
and again they try to sustain it by legalistic and technical construction of the testin10ny and by pure inference
in the facts of positive testimony to the contrary, and
positive testimony of a witness who was the only one in a
position to know that he has no recollection of this fact to
which they attach so much importance. As against this
practice there is the testimony of Sorensen, as hereinabove indicated, that his stock was surrendered on November 1st and that he had no further right to it, nor
any right to remove it from the records of the corporation and it was not removed but appears as Exhibit 2 in
its order of cancelled certificates.
On Page 24 of appellants' brief they continue to
argue that Sorensen did not know how much he would
have to transfer to the corporation. This is absolutely
opposed to the positive evidence of Sorensen and could
not possibly be the fact because Sorensen had to surrender his certificate for 101,000 shares no matter how
much other stock was surrendered. Upon such surrender
then the question as to how much should be re-issued became important and this was determined to be 42,000
shares, as agreed to and affirmed by Mr. Kartchner.
The position of plaintiffs could be maintained if on
~ November 1st Sorensen had surrendered his 101,000 and
:!1
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issued certificates in the sum of 100,000 each to himself
and to Kartchner, but this was not done and according
to positive testimony was never intended. However, appellants treat this transaction as if 100,000 shares were
issued to Sorensen thereby making Kartchners' certificate excessive in the amount of stock represented by
Stanis and Winder. Such an arrangement does not constitute the facts in this case.
Finding No. 19
This finding is supported by the evidence and, as
indicated herein before, ~Irs. Kartchner was called as a
witness ·where she admitted (R. 182) that Mr. Kartchner
did most. of her. business and that they talked this transaction over.
She was called as a witness and did not repudiate or
deny any agency in her husband and this question cannot be raised on the appeal for whatever legal effect it
may have.
-To this may be added that the fact of lack of agency
was never put in issue by Mrs. Kartchner and during
the course of the trial such fact was never raised and was
taken by· the Court and by the parties to be admitted.
Finding No. 20
In support of appellants' position as to this finding,
the same argument is again made. The Court found,
and ·with ample testimony to support it, that there were
no false representations made as to the accounts payable
or at an.
Stated in another way, the stock book of this corporation, as evidenced by Exhibit 3 - an analysis made by
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Judge Jeppson- sliows that instead of tUl over-issue
there is 42,000 shares of stock remaining unissued which
Sorensen claimed. The only question raised by appellants in this connection is whether Dr. Horne should
have signed the certificate or whether Sorensen should
have signed the certificate. In either case, the problern
is one of such technical proportions that it should be
given no legal significance in view of the fact that everybody connected with the corporation considered the stock
valid and the owner of it w~s afforded all the control in
the internal 1nanagement of the company that the stock
represented.
Every presumption should be made where doubt exists in favor of the legality of such a set of circumstances.
This rule is most aptly applied when if such presumption
is exercised the result conforms to the exact intention
of the parties, as is the case here. So, assuming that
Sorensen's stock had not arrived at the office of the
bottling company at the time Dr. Horne signed Kartchners' certificate, the presumption should be applied
in view of Sorensen's testimony that the stock was there
at the time the certificate was delivered to Kartchners
and the stockholders' meeting held on November 1, 1949.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT MADE FINDINGS ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE.

In this section of appellants' brief the objection is
made that the Court did not make findings on material
facts.
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As has been indicated heretofore, the Court made
finding on all these issues scheduled in appellants' brief
from A to E, inclusive. The finding of the Court was
that there was stock available for issue which was amply
supported, as has been indicated, and the Court thereby
made adverse findings to those proposed in this section
of the argument of appellants. The argument here is
the same as under Point I of appellants' brief.
POINT III
THE ISSUANCE OF THE KARTCHNER STOCK IF IRREGULAR WAS VALID.

The remainder of appellants' brief is concerned with
the power of Dr. Horne to sign a valid certificate, and
they continue to assume that Sorensen's stock was not
surrendered.
Assuming this to be true, the law as hereinafter
cited indicates conclusively that under such assumption,
stock issued as was done in this case still becomes effective and is considered to be lawful. The technicalities
involved which are argued by appellants are mere irregularities which are corrected by c~mduct and by the
ability of the corporation to make such corrections.
Dr. Horne, until 'Sorensen was elected and qualified
as president, was the de factrr president of the corporation. See U.C.A. 1953_, 16-2-25:
"ld. Hold Office Until Successors Qualify.
Officers after having duly qualified may
continue to exercise the duties of their offices un. til their successors shall be duly elected or appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed in
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the tnanner prescribed by the articles of incorporation or by-laws, or, in case no provision is made
therein for such removal, according to the provisions of this chapter."
See also 13 Atn. Juris. 859 :
"Further than this, it is a general rule that
the directors or trustees of a corporation hold
over until their successors are elected. Statutes
frequently provide that the directors of a corporation shall hold office for a specified period
(usually one year) and until their successors are
chosen and qualified. The Uniform Act provides
that a director shall hold office for the term for
which he was na1ned or elected and until his successor is elected and qualified, and that except as
otherwise prescribed in the articles or by-laws,
a director shall be elected for a term of one year.
It has also been ruled that the president of a
corporation properly elected holds over until another president is elected, although there is no
special provision in the charter to that effect."
In the situation that exists here, there can be no
question but that Dr. Horne was acting as a de facto
officer even under the assumption made by the appellants. He comes clearly within the definition of such an
officer as set out in 13 Am. Juris. 861 where it is said:
"876. Generally: Who Are de Facto Officers.- A de facto officer of a private corporation may be defined as one in possession of and
exercising the powers of the office under the
claim and color of an election or appointment,
although he is not an officer de jure and may be
removed by proper proceedings. Considering the
effects of his acts, an officer de facto is one whose
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acts, although not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will
hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of
the public and third persons. To constitute one
a de facto officer, he must hold office under some
degree of notoriety or color of title, and the mere
assumption of title to office on one occasion cannot clothes persons with the title of de facto officers. Persons informally or irregularly elected to
office who exercise the functions of the officer are
de facto officers. Thus, where the stockholders or
members of a corporation proceed by an informal
or irregular exercise to an existing power of election to elect certain officers, the persons so elected are, until removal, regarded as officers de

·facto.".
The validity of the acts of such officer is established
under the rules set out in 13 Amer. Juris. 862 :
"877. Validity of Acts of de Facto Officers.
-The de facto doctrine is one of those legal makeshifts by which unlawful or irregular corporate
and public acts are legalized for certain purposes
on the score of necessity. It was introduced into
the laws as a matter of policy and necessity to
protect the interests of the public and individuals
where those interests were involved in the official
acts of persons exercising the duties of an office
without being lawful officers. It is accordingly
well settled that the acts of de· facto officers of
a private corporatio_n are binding as to a third
person who deals with them in ignorance of their
want of legal right to the office. It is likewise the
rule that the acts of directors de facto of a corporation are valid as to third persons."
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Smne point is n1ade in appellants' brief that Dr.
Horne was ineligible to act as an officer of the corporation because he was not a stockholder thereof. The rule
appears to be that in spite of such ineligibility persons
so acting bind the corporation and clothe such acts with
legality both as to the officers and the corporation. See
Amer. Juris. 861 :
"One may be a de facto officer although he
is ineligible to hold the office. To a similar effect,
persons held out by the corporation as its officers may becmne de facto officers. For example,
directors continuing to manage the affairs of the
corporation after the expiration of the term of
their office may becmne de facto directors."
See also Watson v. Johnson, 174 Wash. 12, 24 Pac.
(2) 592, 89 A.L.R.. 1527. In this case, directors of a building and loan association were ineligible to hold office
under the statute because of their lack of stock holding.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that their acts
in behalf of the corporation bound the corporation and
that they acted as de facto officers.
The contention of appellants if it be assumed that
Sorensen's stock was returned unindorsed, cannot be
maintained inasmuch as there was a transfer and deo
livery to the corporation with an intention to pass title of
the Sorensen stock to the corporation on November 1st.
Such a set of cirsumstances entitled the transferee to
specific performance and the trial court in this case was
authorized to hind Sorensen by such transfer and to
consider in this equitable action the maxim that equity
... .....,

~

)
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requires to be done what ought to be done. See 13 Am.
Jur. 415.
"According to the prevailing rule, however, a
verbal sale or pledge of stock transfers at least
the equitable title and is valid and binding between the parties. While the printed form of
transfer with power of attorney, commonly placed
on the back of a stock certificate, furnishes a convenient and appropriate means of transfer in the
ordinary course of business, such transfer may
also be made by delivery of unindorsed certificates together with specific assignments. Under
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the delivery of a
certificate by the person appearing to be the
owner thereof without the necessary indorsement,
but with intent to transfer such certificate or
shares, imposes upon the person so delivering
an obligation, which may be specifically enforced,
to complete the transaction by making the necessary indorsement."
The case of in re Hombach and Company, 9 Fed. (2)
359, (Third Circuit) is a case exactly in poh1t and involves ·the action of a corporation and its officers in issuing stock over and above the authorized limits prescribed by the articles of incorporation. In that case
Rombach and Company were bankr_upt. The claims of
plaintiffs who had purchased this over~issued. stock.were
disallowed in the bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff purchased the stock and claimed it void because the stock
was in excess of the authorized amount and that they
thereby became creditors of the corporation. The bankruptcy court held the .stock valid, _which holding was affirmed on this appeal. The authorized capital stock of
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the corporation was $200,000. The directors authorized
an increase to $250,000 and issued $261,000. None of the
statutory procedures for such increase were complied
with. A year later, one of many of the statutory procedures was made which consisted of a state~nent to the
Secretary of the Conunonwealth which showed an increase to $350,000. This Federal Court holds squarely
in conformity "ith the line of cases cited therein, that
in the event of the irregularity in the issuance of shares,
the shares so issued are valid if by any legal procedure
the corporation can correct such irregularity even
though they are required to increase their capital stock.
The court said:
"On the other hand, stock which the corporation has power to issue, but issues irregularly,
is valid as to the holder, and in a suit for the payment of such stock he may not defend on the
ground that it was irrregularly issued. The state
alone may raise the question of irregularity.
"It has also long since been settled in the
federal and in many state courts that one who
contracts with an acting corporation cannot defend himself against a claim on his contract in
a suit_ by the corporation by alleging the irregularity of its organization. The same rule applies
to the increase of the stock of a corporation in
a suit for the payment of stock constituting the
increase. The trustee of a bankrupt corporation
represents both the corporation and its creditors,
and in a suit by him for the payment of the stock
forming the increase, which the corporation had
power to issue, but issued irregularly, the defense
of the irregularity of the issue cannot prevail.
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Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 14
Johns. (N.Y.) 238, 7 Am. Dec. 459; Buffalo &
Allegheny Railroad Co. v. Cary, 26 N.Y. 75;
Chubb v. Upton, 95 U.S. 665, 24 L. Ed. 523; Pull.
man v. Upton, 96 U.S. 328, 24 L. Ed. 818; Handley
v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417, 424, 11 S. Ct. 530, 35 L. Ed.
227."
POINT IV
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED 'FROM OBTAINING
ANY RELIEF.

The testimony of Fred Sorensen in this case as corroborated by Dr. Horne, was entitled to the full confidence of the trial court. This testimony is to the effect
that Mr. Kartchner knew of the stock holding prior to
November 1st and fully appreciated the fact that Sorensen's certificate would be and was surrendered. The
matter of the failure of the other stock being surrendered
and the position of Sorensen in having his stock holding
reduced was discussed on numerous occasions before November 1st. Within a month after November 1st, the
matter was discussed in a meeting with Homer Winder
wherein it was understood that Sorensen was a minority
stockholder. Still later, and in June of 1950, Kartchner
acknowledged that he was aware of the fact that Sorensen was entitled. to only 42,000 shares of stock and had
known this since November 1, 1949. At this time he was
negotiating a sale of his stock to Mrs. Winder, and there
was no dispute as to the relative holdings of all the persons involved.
In addition to this, and has been previously indicated, Kartchner ·was the secretary of the corporation
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and in possession of the stock books and records, and
these records contained the Sorensen certificate throughout the whole time involved.
Appellants were in the best position of anyone connected with this corporation to know what the stock
holdings were, and yet no objection was made to any
irregularity. Their failure to object to anything surrounding their purchase of stock is easily understandable
because there was nothing wrong with it. Assuming as
they do that there 'vas, appellants were in the best position of anyone to make such discovery. Finally, they
paid practically all the purchase price for their stock
after November 1, 1949.
Law or equity places the burden upon contracting
parties to either assume the obligations incident thereto
or to rescind the same if they are so entitled. Such parties cannot withhold action until they determine whether
the result of such a contract is to their advantage or disadvantage, and then make an election. This principle is
especially true where the corporate stock is involved. See
13 Am. J ur. 260:
"It is well settled that rescission by a stockholder who claims to have been defrauded in his
purchase of the stock cannot rescind after th~
corporation is insolvent and in the hands of a receiver."
Burningham v. Burke, 245 Pac. 977, is a Utah case
which is now established as the leading authority for
the doctrine that persons claiming to be defrauded are
subject to the doctrine of laches and cannot rescind a
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stock subscription contract as against creditors who became such after the date of the subscription.
The case of Skola v. Merrill, 65 Pac. (2) 185, (Utah
1937) is controlling in this case and the holding there
precludes these appellants from any relief.
In this action plaintiff sued the Deseret Mortuary
Company, Charles S. Merrill, an officer, and others, as a
result of a stock purchase by plaintiff. The action was
one for rescission based upon the false representation
made by Charles S. Merrill and others. The trial court
found for plaintiff and the Supreme Court dismissed the
case as to the Deseret Mortuary and sent the case back
for a new trial as to the other defendants after receiving
the evidence.
After plaintiff purchased the stock, he attended two
stockholders meetings and a directors meeting. The
representation claimed to be false was that the LDS
Church was a stockholder and would not allow the company to fail financially. This Court held squarely that
rescission would n~t be granted under these circumstances inasmuch as 'Skola had full opportunity to examine the books and determine for himself in less than
three years what the exact status of the stockholding
was. The Court said:
"At the stockholders' meetings full information was obtainable as to who the stockholders
were, the amount of stock issued, and what, if any,
church ,position they or any of them held. There
is not anything in the record to indicate that he
could not have had access to the books and records
of the company at any time for the purpose of
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learning these facts. ., • • It would seern 1nore
than a 1nere coincidence that the time fixed by
hin1 when he learned of the fraud, that is, in
JulY of 1932, is almost of the exact time when the
fimi.ncial depression reached its lowest point and
was only two months before the Deseret l\{ortuary
and the :Jierrill :Jiortuaries, Inc., went into receivership."
The concurring opinion of Justice Elias Hansen
points up the striking snnilarity between the facts in
this case and the facts in the Skola case as witnessed by
the following excerpt from this opinion.
"During the period that lapsed between the
time of the purchase and the bringing of this suit,
plaintiff could have readily ascertained the truth
or falsity of the representations which he claims
induced him to purchase the stock. He attended
stockholders' and directors' meetings. The only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence in the record before us is that plaintiff was
content with his deal until he was disappointed
in his hope and expectation of realizing large
profits from his investment. Even if there were
some over-reaching of the Merrills in selling the
stock, still the remedy of rescission is not open to
plaintiff because he failed to act within a reasonable time after he discovered or had a reasonable
opportunity to discover the fraud. Rescission is
denied whenever the one seeking it fails to act
promptly after the discovery of the fraud, or,
what amounts to the same thing, after he had had
a reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud.
6 R.C.L. 935, 317. That plaintiff had ample opportunity to discover the fraud practiced upon
him, if any, soon after the occurrence of the trans33
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action complained of is clear. He should not be
permitted to hold the stock to see if it would turn
out to be a profitable investment despite the
claimed fraud and then when it did not prove
profitable recover back all that he paid."
It is conceded that there was no deliberate act by
Dr. Horne or Sorensen which would constitute fraud.
It is contended by appellants that an act committed in
good faith by these persons resulted in a situation made
fraudulent by rules of law. Neither Dr. Horne or Sorensen were in a position to discover this purported technical irregularity in the issuance of this stock. Mr.
l{artchner was in the best position to do so. As Secretary of this corporation, it was his duty to keep and
maintain the corporate records and to see that they
were in order. Full information was at his finger tips
as to who the stockholders were. The records of stockholdings of this corporation were easily and readily
ascertainable by him in order to establish the truth or
falsity of any representation made by the appearance
of any stock certificate. This is the test laid down in
the Skola case, Supra, and precludes a recovery in this
action.
Appellants, during the argument in the trial court
and in their brief, have presented no cases with facts
similar to those present here. And no case has been
.
discovered where liability of officers of a corporation IS
upheld where there has not been a deliberate or conscious
intent to defraud a prospective purchaser of such stock.
No case has been discovered where such liability is im·
posed rinless there was some awareness on the part of

.
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the officers held liable of the Inisrepresentation being
made.
The cases and notes cited by appellants have conlmon in them the fact of misrepresentation. The stock
certificate of appellants does not contain a misrepresentation anywhere on its face and no misrepresentation
was ever made, either in law or in fact. The sig-nature
of Dr. Horne over the title President was made either
as a de jure or de facto officer as indicated hereinabove.
The annotations at 73 A.L.R. 1120 and 99 A.L.R.
852 and the cases cited therefrom all deal with actual
misrepresentations and are not similar in facts or principle to the problem involved here. These cases and notes
all deal, where liability of a director is concerned, with
charging such director with negligence or a consciousness
that a false representation is being made. The case of
Pruitt v. Oklahoma Steam Baking Company, 135 Pac.
730 is not in point, and the case of Garnett v. State ex rel
Bank Commissioner, 19 Pac. (2) 375 is not in point
under these facts. In the Garnett case an increase stock
not authorized by statute was sustained, and it was held
there that such an increase could be ratified by estoppel.
The court in the Garnett case sets out the rule to be as
follows:
"14 C.J. 496, announces the following rule:
'The capital stock of a corporation cannot
legally be increased except to the extent; under
the conditions and in the manner prescribed by
the charter or statute, as the case may be, although mere irregularities in proceedings may be
35
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cured by cond~tct amounting to acquiescence, ratification, or estoppel, and an increase will not
necessarily be invalidated as between the corporation and the assenting stockholders by a failure to comply with requirements intended for
the benefit of the public. The provisions of the
charter or other governing statute touching an
increase of the capital stock of a corporation
must govern subsisting contractual requirement~
in the making of such increase.'

* * * •
'The true rule is, when action is brought in
behalf of creditors by the representative of an
insolvent financial corporation, like a bank or
trust company organized and conducted for the
purpose of soliciting and receiving deposits from
the public, to enforce the statutory liability of its
stockholders, that those, who have subscribed for
an increase of stock within the power of the corporation to make, who have received and accepted certificates of stock issued to them, and whose
names thus have been entered on the books of the
corporation as stockholders, who have collected
and kept dividends on such stock, and who have
acted as stockholders directly or indirectly in the
management of the corporation, will not be heard
to defeat such am action on the ground that the
stock was increased in an irregular or unlawful
manner.'"
In the East River Bottom Water Company cases,
128 Pac. (2) 277 and 167 Pac. (2) 693, the factual situation was that stock was re-issued by the corporation
upon representation to it that the original certificates
were lost. These cases are patently not in point upon
their facts or legal principles with this case.

36
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Oregon cases including Wills vs. Nehale·m Coal
Company, 96 Pac. (2) 528, are not in point, inasmuch
as there was a conscious act and intentional omission
by the directors of the corporation involved, which
amounted to a misrepresentation.
This case is easily distinguishable from those cited
by appellants, because in this case there is no representation in the first place. In the second place, the
court found that stock was present and available for
re-issue and was re-issued. These findings, as has been
indicated, are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellants in this action have invoked the aid of a
court of equity in the hope of rescinding a stock purchase
agreement. It is conceded on all sides that there was no
over-reaching or intent to cheat or defraud them by respondents. The stock so purchased has, since the time
of purchase, been treated as valid and subsisting by all
persons connected with the corporation. There was
positive and conclusive evidence that there was nothing
irregular about the issuance of the stock and that it
was exactly as represented.
Appellants, by inference and innuendo are trying to
warp isolated parts of this evidence into a pattern of
fact which would indicate that Sorensen's stock was not
surrendered or endorsed prior to the minute and hout
on November 1 when Kartchner's certificate was issued.
The positive evidence is that Sorensen's stock was surrendered on November 1.
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The correctness of the decision reached by the trial
court is conclusively demonstrated by placing the shoe
on the other foot. For example, there can be no doubt
as to the outcome of a law suit under these facts if
Sorensen had been the plaintiff suing to have Kartchner's stock declared invalid. The simple answer to such
a law suit would be that equity would require Sorensen
to surrender his stock if he had not already done so
and thereby insure the validity of Kartchner's stock.
Appellants therefore have been completely protected
in this transaction from the beginning and these respondents should be similarly treated.
Finally, under the rule in the Skala case, Supra,
appellants are precluded from any recovery herein. The
The language of Justice Hansen in that case to the
effect that the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the evidence was that plaintiff was content with
his deal until disappointed in his hope for profit and
that a plaintiff should not be permitted to hold stock
to see if it would turn out to be profitable despite a
claim of fraud and when it did not prove profitable
recover what he had paid. This statement of Justice
Hansen explains and describes the conduct of these
appellants in this case. The sale of this stock was in
all respects made in good faith, and such sale was recognized not only by the parties participating therein, but
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by all other stockholders of the corporation. It is submitted that appellants suffered no civil wrong at the
hands of these respondents and that the decision of the
trial court which reached this conclusion should be

sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER,
Attorneys for Defendants

and Respondents.
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